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C0MMENTARY / VIEWPOINTS

Assuming that the contingent fee agreement results
in an immediate transfer of property, is the property transferred subject to a substantial risk of
forfeiture? The answer is yes. The general rule is
that regardless of the specific language of the
contingent fee agreement, an attorney forfeits any
right to a fee if the attorney withdraws from the
case or is discharged for cause prior to final disposition of the matter. . . . As a result, the attorney’s
receipt of property upon execution of a contingent
fee agreement is subject to a substantial risk of
forfeiture until final disposition of the case.11
Thus, regardless of which of Prof. Polsky’s views
applies, there is no transfer for tax purposes on execution
of the contract. Once the case has been finalized and the
risk of forfeiture is removed, the transfer officially occurs
for tax purposes. Because the plaintiff transferred property in exchange for services, the plaintiff must recognize
the difference between the value of the services received
from the attorneys and the plaintiff’s basis in the property transferred. As the plaintiff will have a zero basis in
the property, she will recognize the full amount as
income.12
An interesting issue arising out of Prof. Polsky’s
theory regarding the application of section 83 is the
possible application of section 83(b). Taxpayers can elect,
under section 83(b), to include in income property that is
still subject to substantial risk of forfeiture. So the attorney could elect under section 83(b) to include her portion
of the claim in income on execution of the contract, rather
than wait until the final disposition of the case. That
election has been described as a ‘‘tax gamble’’ because the
taxpayer will not be able to take a deduction for the
amount included in income if the property is subsequently forfeited. In the usual situation, the benefit for a
taxpayer in making the election is that the property
typically will be valued at a lower amount at the time of
the election; and, if the property vests at a higher value,
the taxpayer will not have to include the difference in
income. The taxpayer’s subsequent gain on the sale of the
property will also be converted from ordinary services
income to the lower capital gains rate.13 However, in the
attorney fee example, neither of those advantages of a
section 83(b) election applies to the attorney. On resolution of the case, the attorney would include in income

any amount she received on the claim over her basis in
the interest. Also, the excess amount will be characterized
as ordinary income.14
For example, assume Peter Plaintiff, who has a claim
for damages that will be taxable income to him, signs a
contingent fee agreement with Leslie Lawyer, and Leslie
makes a section 83(b) election. Leslie will have income
equal to the value of the transferred claim as payment for
services and will have a basis equal to that amount. At
that time, Peter will recognize income of the same
amount because his basis in the transferred property is
zero, and it is assumed that transfers in an arm’s- length
exchange are of equal value. Because the execution of the
contract occurs early in the lawsuit process, there is
uncertainty as to whether they will win their case, and so
the value of the claim (and therefore of Leslie’s services)
may be greatly discounted. Peter will be allowed a
miscellaneous itemized deduction for the payment to
Leslie for her services,15 but the limitations on that
deduction likely will prevent it from offsetting all of
Peter’s income.
If they win, Peter will receive his portion of the award
and will be taxed on that amount. Leslie will be required
to recognize the difference between the amount she
received and her basis in her portion of the claim (which
will equal the amount she included in income when she
made the section 83(b) election). Thus, the usual section
83(b) election advantages would not apply to Leslie.
Not only is there no advantage to Leslie to make the
election, but there are several disadvantages. Specifically,
by making the election, she will recognize income for
receiving an interest in a claim that may be disallowed.
Even if the claim is sustained, she will have recognized
some of her income at an earlier point of time (that is,
when the election was made). While Leslie likely can
deduct the loss she suffers if the claim is disallowed and
proves to be worthless (becoming worthless is not a
forfeiture16), the time value of money principle will still
leave her at a disadvantage.
So why would Leslie make such an election? The
answer is that it might help Peter. Once Leslie makes the
section 83(b) election, that portion of the claim belongs to
her for tax purposes. Therefore, when the case reaches a
final disposition and the claim is sustained, Peter can
argue that he had already sold that portion of the claim to
Leslie for adequate consideration and therefore is not
taxable on the amount paid to her. Peter was taxed at the
time of the election on the value of his right to Leslie’s
services, but that value likely will be much less than the
amount ultimately collected by Leslie if the claim is
sustained.

11

Polsky, ‘‘Fruit and Trees,’’ supra note 1 at 109. See section
83(c)(1), which states, ‘‘The rights of a person in property are
subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture if such person’s rights
to full enjoyment of such property are conditioned upon the
future performance of substantial services by any individual.’’
12
Polsky, ‘‘Fruits and Trees,’’ supra note 1 at 110. See also Treas.
reg. section 1.83-6(b) (‘‘[A]t the time of a transfer of property in
connection with the performance of services, the transferor
recognizes gain to the extent that the transferor receives an
amount that exceeds the transferor’s basis in the property’’).
13
See Daniel Q. Posin and Donald B. Tobin, Principles of
Federal Income Taxation 72-74 (6th Ed. Thomson West).
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14

Because there was no sale or exchange and because the
claim is not a debt instrument under section 1271, the gain the
attorney recognized by collecting on the claim is ordinary
income.
15
Section 212(1). The payment to Leslie equals the value of
the portion of the claim that was assigned to her.
16
See Treas. reg. section 1.83-2(a). If Leslie were to quit
representation of Peter, she would not be able to take a
deduction for the amount she included in income.
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substantial risk of forfeiture until that time as the interest
vests. As Prof. Polsky notes:
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nario, so it is unresolved whether a court would accept
that treatment when it proves favorable to the taxpayer. It
may become a moot issue if the Supreme Court or
Congress fixes the problem. However, attorneys should
certainly consider the possibility of making a section
83(b) election when their clients are facing the possible
harsh tax result currently imposed on many taxpayers.
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However, to make the election is a bit of a gamble
because Peter could be slightly disadvantaged by it. If the
claim is denied, Peter will have reported and paid tax on
the ‘‘sale’’ of part of the claim; and while Peter will have
been allowed a miscellaneous itemized deduction for the
payment to Leslie for her services, the limitations on that
deduction will not fully compensate him.
It does not appear that any plaintiff taxpayer has
attempted to use section 83(b) in the attorney fee sce-

